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NONSEPARABILITY, POTENTIALITY AND THE CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE
OF QUANTUM OBJECTS
VASSILIOS KARAKOSTAS∗
SUMMARY.  Standard quantum mechanics undeniably violates the notion of separability that classical
physics accustomed us to consider as valid. By relating the phenomenon of quantum nonseparability to the
all-important concept of potentiality, we effectively provide a coherent picture of the puzzling entangled
correlations among spatially separated systems. We further argue that the generalized phenomenon of
quantum nonseparability implies contextuality for the production of well-defined events in the quantum
domain, whereas contextuality entails in turn a structural-relational conception of quantal objects, viewed as
carriers of dispositional properties. It is finally suggested that contextuality, if considered as a
conditionalization preparation procedure of the object to be measured, naturally leads to a separable concept
of reality whose elements are experienced as distinct, well-localized objects having determinate properties.
In this connection, we find it necessary to distinguish the meaning of the term reality from the criterion of
reality for us. The implications of the latter considerations for the notion of objectivity in quantum
mechanics are also discussed.
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1.   THE MEANING OF THE SEPARABILITY PRINCIPLE IN CLASSICAL PHYSICS
Classical physics is essentially atomistic in character. It portrays a view of the world in
terms of analyzable, separately existing but interacting self-contained parts. Classical
physics is also reductionistic. It aims at explaining the whole of forms of physical
existence, of structures and relations of the natural world in terms of a salient set of
elementary material objects linked by forces. Classical physics (and practically any
experimental science) is further based on the Cartesian dualism of ‘res cogitans’
(‘thinking substance’) and ‘res extensa’ (‘extended substance’), proclaiming a radical
separation of an objective external world from the knowing subject that allows no
possible intermediary.
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2     In fact, the whole edifice of classical physics  be it point-like analytic, statistical, or
field theoretic  is compatible with the following separability principle that can be
expressed schematically as follows:
Separability Principle: The states of any spatio-temporally separated subsystems S1,
S2, ..., SN of a compound system S are individually well-defined and the states of
the compound system are wholly and completely determined by them and their
physical interactions including their spatio-temporal relations (cf. Howard 1989;
Healey 1991).
     In the case, for instance, of point-like analytic mechanics, the state of a compound
system consisting of N point particles is specified by considering all pairs {q3N(t), p3N(t)}
of the generalized position and momentum coordinates of the individual particles. Hence,
at any temporal moment t, the individual pure state of the compound system consists of
the N-tuple ω = (ω1, ω2, ... , ωΝ), where {ωi}= {qi, pi} are the pure states of its
constituent subsystems. It is then clear that in the individual, analytical interpretation of
classical mechanics maximal knowledge of the constituent parts of a compound system
provides maximal knowledge of the whole system (see, for example, Scheibe 1973, pp.
53-54). Accordingly, every property the compound system has at time t, if encoded in ω,
is determined by {ωi}. For instance, any classical physical quantities (such as mass,
momentum, angular momentum, kinetic energy, center of mass motion, gravitational
potential energy, etc.) pertaining to the overall system are determined in terms of the
corresponding quantities of its parts. They either constitute direct sums or ordinary
functional relations (whose values are well-specified at each space-time point) of the
relevant quantities of the subsystems. Thus, they are wholly determined by the subsystem
states. Furthermore, given the state ωt(q, p) of a classical system in phase space at time t,
the dynamical law which connects ωt with the state ωt´(q, p) of the system at any other
time t´ is given by the Hamiltonian H(q, p) and the canonical equations. This means that a
classical system St, uniquely defined at time t, can be re-identified at any other time t´≠t
by the phase point (pt, qt) values on its dynamical trajectory. Hence, classical physics
determines objects-systems as individuals with temporal identity. They can be identified
through conservation of their essential quantities, re-identified in time, and distinguished
from their like. The foregoing concise analysis delimits actually the fact, upon which the
whole classical physics is founded, that any compound physical system of a classical
3universe can be conceived of as consisting of separable, individual parts interacting by
means of forces, which are encoded in the Hamiltonian function of the overall system,
and that, if the full Hamiltonian is known, maximal knowledge of the values of the
physical quantities pertaining to each one of these parts yields an exhaustive knowledge
of the whole compound system, in perfect conformity with the aforementioned
separability principle.
     The notion of separability has been viewed within the framework of classical physics
as a principal condition of our conception of the world, a condition that characterizes all
our thinking in acknowledging the physical identity of distant things, the “mutually
independent existence (the ‘being thus’)” of spatio-temporally separated systems
(Einstein 1948/1971, p. 169). The primary implicit assumption pertaining to this view is a
presumed absolute kinematic independence between the knowing subject (the physical
scientist) and the object of knowledge, or equivalently, between the measuring system (as
an extension of the knowing subject) and the system under measurement. The idealization
of the kinematically independent behavior of a physical system is possible in classical
physics both due to the Cartesian-product structure of phase space, namely, the state-
space of classical theories, and the absence of genuine indeterminism in the course of
events or of an element of chance in the measurement process. During the act of
measurement a classical system conserves its identity. Successive measurements of
physical quantities, like position and momentum that define the state of a classical
system, can be performed to any degree of accuracy and the results combined can
completely determine the state of the system before and after the measurement
interaction, since its effect, if not eliminable, takes place continuously in the system’s
state-space and is therefore predictable in principle.
    Consequently, classical physical quantities or properties are taken to obey a so-called
‘possessed values’ principle, in the sense that the values of classical properties are
considered as being possessed by the object itself independently of any measurement act.
That is, the properties possessed by an object depend in no way on the relations obtaining
between it and a possible experimental context used to bring these properties about. No
qualitatively new elements of reality are produced by the interaction of a classical system
with the measuring apparatus. The act of measurement in classical physics is passive; it
simply reveals a fact which has already occurred. In other words, a substantial distinction
between potential and actual existence is rendered obsolete in classical mechanics.
Within the domain of the latter, all that is potentially possible is also actually realized in
4the course of time, independently of any measuring interventions. It should be noted, in
this respect, that this is hardly the case in the quantum theory of the measurement process.
2.   NONSEPARABILITY AND ITS RELATION TO POTENTIALITY
IN QUANTUM PHYSICS
In contrast to classical physics, standard quantum mechanics systematically violates the
conception of separability.1 From a formal point of view, the source of its defiance is due
to the tensor-product structure of a compound Hilbert space, which is not simply
restricted to the topological (Cartesian) state-space but it includes it as a proper subset,
and the quantum-mechanical principle of the superposition of states, which incorporates a
kind of objective indefiniteness for the numerical values of any observable belonging to a
superposed state. As a means of explicating the preceding factors in concrete physical
terms, let us consider the simplest possible case of a compound system S consisting of a
pair of subsystems S1 and S2 with corresponding Hilbert spaces H1 and H2. Naturally,
subsystems S1 and S2, in forming system S, have interacted by means of forces at some
time t0 and suppose that at times t > t0 they are spatially separated. Then, any pure state W
of the compound system S can be expressed in the tensor-product Hilbert space H =
H1⊗H2 in the Schmidt form
                W = P|Ψ> = |Ψ><Ψ| = ∑i ci (|ψi>⊗|φi>),          || |Ψ> ||2 = ∑i |ci|2 = 1 ,                (1)
where {|ψi>} and {|φi>} are orthonormal vector bases in H1 (of S1) and H2 (of S2),
respectively.
     If there is just one term in the W-representation of Eq. (1), i.e., if |ci| = 1, the state W =
|ψ>⊗|φ> of the compound system forms a product state: a state that can always be
decomposed into a single tensor-product of an S1-state and an S2-state. In this
circumstance, each subsystem of the compound system possesses a separable and well-
defined state, so that the state of the overall system consists of nothing but the sum of the
subsystem states in consonance with the separability principle of Section 1. This is the
only highly particular as well as idealised case in which a separability principle holds in
quantum mechanics. For, even if a compound system at a given temporal instant is
appropriately described by a product state  W(t) = |ψ(t)> ⊗ |φ(t)>  the preservation of
its identity under the system’s natural time evolution  W(t2) = U(t2-t1) W(t1), for all t∈R
 implies that the Hamiltonian H (i.e., the energy operator of the system) should be
5decomposed into the direct sum of the subsystem Hamiltonians  H = H1 ⊗ I2 + I1 ⊗ H2
 and this is precisely the condition of no interaction between S1 and S2 (e.g., Blank et
al. 1994, Ch. 11). Obviously, in such a case, subsystems S1 and S2 behave in an entirely
uncorrelated and independent manner. Correlations, even of a probabilistic nature, among
any physical quantities corresponding to the two subsystems are simply non existent,
since for any two observables A1 and A2 pertaining to S1 and S2, respectively, the
probability distributions of A1 and of A2 are disconnected: Tr (A1⊗A2) (|ψ>⊗|φ>) = Tr
(A1 |ψ>)⋅Tr (A2 |φ>).
     If, however, there appear more than one term in the W-representation of the compound
system, i.e., if |ci| < 1, then there exist entangled correlations (of the well-known EPR-
type) between subsystems S1 and S2. It can be shown in this case that there are no
subsystem states |ξ> (∀ |ξ>∈H1) and |χ> (∀ |χ>∈H2) such that W is equivalent to the
conjoined attribution of |ξ> to subsystem S1 and |χ> to subsystem S2, i.e., W ≠ |ξ> ⊗ |χ>.2
Thus, when a compound system, such as S, is in an entangled state W, namely a
superposition of pure states of tensor-product forms, neither subsystem S1 by itself nor
subsystem S2 by itself is associated with an individual pure state. The normalised unit
vectors |ψi>, |φi> belonging to the Hilbert space of either subsystem are not eigenstates of
the overall state W. Only the compound system, as a unified whole, is assigned a definite
(nonseparable) pure state W, represented appropriately by a state vector in the tensor-
product Hilbert space of S. Maximal knowledge of the whole system, therefore, does not
allow the possibility of acquiring maximal knowledge of its component parts, a
circumstance with no precedence in classical physics. Consequently, the separability
principle of Section 1 is violated.
     The generic phenomenon of quantum nonseparability casts severe doubts on the
existence of isolated (sub)systems and the applicability of the notion of atomism, in the
sense that the parts of a quantum whole no longer exist as precisely defined individual
entities characterized only by intrinsic (non-relational) properties. The nonseparable
character of the behavior of an entangled quantum system precludes in a novel way the
possibility of describing its component subsystems in terms of pure states. In fact,
whenever the pure entangled state of a compound system is decomposed in order to
represent subsystems, the effect can only extent up to a representation in terms of
statistical (reduced) states of those subsystems. For, whenever a compound system is in
an entangled state, as in Eq. (1), there are, in general, no pure states of the component
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completely determined. Consequently, the legendary notion of the classical paradigm that
the nature of the whole is fully describable or reducible to the properties of the parts is no
longer defensible. In the framework of quantum mechanics, the state of the whole system
cannot in general be determined by the states of its component parts, this being the case
even when the parts occupy distinct regions of space however far apart. Since, at the
quantum domain, it is exclusively only the compound state of the whole system that
exhaustively specifies the probabilistic entangled correlations among the states of its
parts. Hence, any case of quantum entanglement constitutes a violation of the separability
principle, and the latter is the reason why entanglement induces a sort of holism in
quantum mechanics.
     The phenomenon of quantum nonseparability indeed reveals the holistic character of
entangled quantum systems. Quantum mechanics is the first  and up to day the only 
mathematically formulated and empirically well-confirmed theory, which incorporates as
its basic feature that the ‘whole’ is, in a non-trivial way, more than the sum of its ‘parts’
including their spatio-temporal relations and physical interactions. Contrary to the
situation in classical physics, when considering an entangled compound system, ‘whole’
and ‘parts’ are related in such a way that their bi-directional reduction is, in principle,
impossible (see, for instance, Karakostas 2004). Intimately related to this, there exist
properties considering any entangled quantum system which, in a clearly specifiable
sense, characterize the whole system but are neither reducible to nor implied by or
derived from any combination of local properties of its parts. As a means of exemplifying
the preceding points, let us consider an important class of compound quantum systems
that form the prototype of EPR-entangled systems, namely, spin-singlet pairs. Let then S
be a compound system consisting of a pair (S1, S2) of spin-1/2 particles in the singlet state
                                 WS = 1/√2 {|ψ+>1 ⊗ |φ->2  −  |ψ->1 ⊗ |φ+>2},                                   (2)
where {|ψ± >1} and {|φ± >2}are orthonormal bases in the two-dimensional Hilbert spaces
H1 and H2 associated with S1 and S2, respectively. As well-known, in such a case, it is
quantum mechanically predicted and experimentally confirmed that the spin components
of S1 and of S2 have always opposite spin orientations; they are perfectly anticorrelated.
Whenever the spin component of S1 along a given direction is found to be +1/2 !
(correspondingly −1/2 !), then the spin component of S2 along the same direction must
necessarily be found to be –1/2 ! (correspondingly +1/2 !), and conversely. From a
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interrelations) with which the subsystem states |ψ> and |φ>  or, more precisely, the two
product states |ψ+>1⊗|φ->2, |ψ->1⊗|φ+>2  are combined within WS. This, in turn, leads
not only to the subsystem interdependence of the type described above, but also to
conservation of the total angular momentum for the pair (S1, S2) of spin-1/2 particles, and
thus to the property of definite total spin of value zero for the compound system S.
     The latter is a holistic property of S: it is not determined by any physical properties of
its subsystems S1, S2 considered individually. Specifically, the property of S ‘having total
spin zero’ is not specified by the spin properties of S1 and of S2, since neither S1 nor S2
has any definite spin in the superposed singlet state WS. Moreover, the probability
distributions concerning spin components of S1 and of S2 along some one direction do not
ensure, with probability one, S’s possession of this property. Neither the latter could be
understood or accounted for by the possibility (that a strict adherent of reductionism may
favor) of treating S1 and S2 separately at the expense of postulating a relation between
them as to the effect of their spin components ‘being perfectly anticorrelated’. For, while
‘having total spin zero’ is an intrinsic physical property of the compound system S in the
nonseparable state WS, the assumed relation is not an intrinsic physical relation that S1
and S2 may have in and of themselves. That is, although the relation of perfect
anticorrelation is encoded within state WS, ascribing this relation to individual parts of a
system is not tantamount to being in state WS. The relation of perfect anticorrelation is
inherent to the entangled state WS itself, whose nonseparable nature dictates, in fact, all
that can be said about the spin properties of S1 and S2, because it is only the entangled
state of the whole that contains the correlations among the spin probability distributions
pertaining to the parts.3 Hence, the part-whole reduction with respect to the property of
total spin zero has failed: the latter property, whereas characterizes the whole system, is
irreducible to any properties of its constituent parts. Exactly the same holds for the
properties of total momentum and relative distance of the overall system S with respect to
the corresponding local properties of its parts. Analogous considerations, of course, to the
aforementioned paradigmatic case of the spin-singlet pair of particles apply to any case of
quantum entanglement. Entanglement need not be of maximal anticorrelation, as in the
example of the singlet state. It does neither have to be confined to states of quantum
systems of the same kind; entanglement reaches in principle the states of all compound
quantum systems.
8     This is precisely the delicate point with entangled correlations in Hilbert-space
quantum mechanics: they cannot be reduced to or explained in terms of pre-assigned
relations or interactions among the parts; their existence cannot be traced back to any
interactions. Whereas the smallest interaction during the temporal development of the
parts of a compound system gives rise to entanglement, entanglement itself needs no
recourse to interaction for its being established. Interaction is a sufficient but not a
necessary condition for entanglement. Quantum entanglement does occur in the absence
of any interactions, since the origin of the phenomenon is essentially of a kinematical
rather than dynamical nature. Due to that the entangled correlations among the states of
physical systems do not acquire the status of a causally determined relation.4 Their
delineation instead is specified by the entangled quantum state itself which refers directly
to the whole system.
     To disclose the primary kinematical character of quantum entanglement, as well as its
relation to the superposition principle, the states of a system involved in a superposed
vector of the form, |Ψ>=∑ici|ψi>, ∑i|ci|2 =1, should be explicitly interpreted so as to refer
to potentially realized (through the measurement process or ‘spontaneously’ in nature)
states |ψi>, each possessing a probability amplitude ci of occurrence. The principle of
superposition of states is inseparably linked with the interference of such probability
amplitudes, cici*, reflecting the nature of the interrelations among the states of a quantal
system. Accordingly, any physical variable A that is associated with a superposed state
|Ψ> possess no definite value at all, rendering unattainable thereby a Boolean yes-no
classification of A in |Ψ>. In other words, for any physical variable A in a superposed
state |Ψ> of eigenstates of A and any proposition P concerning A, it is not true that either
P holds or its complement I−P holds. In such a circumstance, the possible numerical
values of A are objectively indeterminate and not simply unknown. The objectivity of the
indeterminacy of A stems from the fact that the probabilities of the various possible
outcomes or realizations of A are designated by the superposed state itself, a feature with
no analogue in classical mechanics.
     Consequently, a superposed state or a general quantum-mechanical pure state can be
defined independently of measurement only by a probability distribution of potentially
possible values which pertain to the physical quantities of a system. Hence, the quantum
state may be construed in an ontic sense, regardless of any operational procedures, as
representing a network of potentialities, namely, a field of potentially possible and not
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characterize a transition from potentiality to actuality or from a situation of indefiniteness
to definiteness. It also intends to signify that quantum-mechanical potentialities condition
but do not control the production of actual events.
     The concept of quantum-mechanical potentiality corresponds to the tendency of a
quantum system to display a certain measurement result out of a set of multiplied
possibilities in case a suitable measurement is made.6 When, for instance, in the standard
EPR-Bohm example, a pair of particles (S1, S2) is in the spin-singlet state of Eq. (2), no
spin component of either particle exists in a precisely defined form. All three spin
components of each particle, however, coexist in a potential form and any one component
possess the tendency of being actualized at the expense of the indiscriminacy of the others
if the associated particle interacts with an appropriate measuring apparatus. As soon as
such an interaction takes place, for example, at time to, and the spin component along a
given direction of , say, particle S1 is measured and found equal to +1/2!, the subsequent
destruction of the superposition bonds (between the tensor-product states involved)
imparts to particle S2 a potentiality: that of inducing, with probability one, the opposite
value −1/2!, if and when, at a time t>to, particle S2 is submitted to an appropriate
measurement of the same component of spin as S1. Thus, the spin-singlet state, furnishing
the standard EPR-Bohm example, describes the entanglement, the inseparable correlation
of potentialities.
     The singlet state (as any entangled state) represents in essence a set of potentialities
whose content is not exhausted by a catalogue of actual, pre-existing values that may be
assigned to the spin properties of S1 and of S2, separately. It may be worthy to observe in
this connection that in the EPR-Bohm example no spin property of particle S2 enjoyed a
well-defined value prior to the measurement performed on S1 and a different value in the
sequel. The only change occurring in S2 concerns the transition of a spin property from a
potentially possible value to an actually realized value. If the actualized values of all spin
properties of S2 were pre-determined, then the behavior of S2 would be fixed in advance
regardless of any reference to system S1, and vice versa. Consequently, the behavior of
the compound  spin-singlet  pair would  be reducible  to the  behavior of  its  parts. A
sense of separability would also had been demonstrated if the actualized values of both S1
and S2 were independent or owed their existence to a common cause in the past (e.g.,
Butterfield 1989). Thus, quantum-mechanical nonseparability is subject to both the
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actualization of potentialities and the confinement of actualization to the dictates of
correlation.
     We stress, in this respect, that the concept of quantum-mechanical potentiality should
not be classified under an epistemic category of apprehension. It does not refer to
someone’s deficient knowledge as to the exact nature of a given object, but it belongs to
the mode of existence of the object itself.7 It constitutes, in Aristotelian terminology, “the
measure of the actual” (Aristotle, Physics, 207b). It characterizes the degree of realization
of a potentially possible event determined by objective physical conditions, namely, by
the internal properties of the object and the specified experimental conditions. Quantum-
mechanical potentialities are physically real and objective not only in the sense of
designating the disposition of an object to expose certain properties when submitted to
given conditions, but also in the sense of interfering, under certain circumstances as in
quantum coherence or quantum entanglement, with one another.
     Thus, when confronting a compound system in an entangled state, one may conceive
that the potentialities of subsystems S1 and S2, constituting the whole system, interfere
with each other in such a way that the probability of a certain result of  a measurement
performed on S1 is dependent upon the result of a measurement performed on S2, and
conversely.8 Or even more acutely, as exemplified in the physically important case of
maximal spin anticorrelation, the actualization of an arbitrary spin component of S1
entails the actualization of the corresponding spin component of S2 with precisely defined
value. Numerous experimental results, whose quantitative character is based on a Bell-
type inequality, strongly testify that this aspect of interfering potentialities does take part
in nature, even when S1 and S2 are spatially separated (e.g., Aspect et al. 1982; Tittel et al.
1998). Furthermore, as has been repeatedly formally shown, there seems to be no way of
utilizing the quantum-mechanical transition from potentiality to actuality for the purpose
of establishing a superluminal communication procedure between S1 and S2 that would
violate special relativity.9 Physically, this is in our view due to the fact that the
appearance of entangled quantum correlations of events at space-like separation does not
refer to the correlation of actual events in external space-time; the creation of entangled
correlations occurs in the realm of potentialities. While actual events take place in space-
time, we never encounter a potentiality at the space-time level. Potential events only refer
to the possible existence of physical entities in a space-time region, they do not
presuppose the actual presence of physical entities in that region. Hence, potentialities do
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not materially propagate in external space-time. This also clarifies, in the light of our
approach, why entangled correlations cannot be utilized for superluminal communication.
3.   THE CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE OF QUANTUM OBJECTS AND RELATED
PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES
From a foundational viewpoint of quantum theory, the concept of quantum entanglement
and the associated phenomenon of quantum nonseparability refer to a context-
independent, or in d’ Espagnat’s (1995) scheme, observer- or mind-independent reality.
The latter is operationally inaccessible. It pertains to the domain of entangled correlations,
potentialities and quantum superpositions obeying a non-Boolean logical structure. Here
the notion of an object, whose aspects may result in intersubjective agreement, enjoys no
a priori meaning independently of the phenomenon into which is embedded. In quantum
mechanics in order to be able to speak meaningfully about an object, to obtain any kind of
description, or refer to experimentally accessible facts the underlying wholeness of nature
should be decomposed into interacting but disentangled subsystems. As will be argued in
the sequel, in consonance with Primas (1993), well-defined separate objects (and their
environments) are generated by means of a so-called Heisenberg cut (1958, 116), namely
through the process of a deliberate abstraction/projection of the inseparable non-Boolean
domain into a Boolean context that necessitates the suppression (or minimization) of
entangled correlations between the object-to-be and the environment-to-be (e.g., a
measuring apparatus).
     The presuppositions of applying a Heisenberg cut are automatically satisfied in
classical physics, in conformity with the separability principle of Section 1. In a
nonseparable theory like quantum mechanics, however, the concept of the Heisenberg cut
acquires the status of a methodological regulative principle through which access to
empirical reality is rendered possible. The innovation of the Heisenberg cut, and the
associated separation of a quantum object from its environment, is mandatory for the
description of measurements (e.g., Atmanspacher 1994). It is, in fact, necessary for the
operational account of any directly observable pattern of empirical reality. The very
possibility of devising and repeating a controllable experimental procedure presupposes
the existence of such a subject-object separation. Without it the concrete world of
material facts and data would be ineligible; it would be conceived in a totally entangled
manner. In this sense, a physical system may account as an experimental or a measuring
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device only if it is not holistically correlated or entangled with the object under
measurement.
     Consequently, any atomic fact or event that ‘happens’ is raised at the empirical level
only in conjunction with the specification of an experimental arrangement 10  an
experimental context that conforms to a Boolean domain of discourse  namely to a set
of observables co-measurable by that context. In other words, there cannot be well-
defined events in quantum mechanics unless a specific set of co-measurable observables
has been singled out for the system-experimental context whole (e.g., Landsman 1995).
For, in the quantum domain, one cannot assume, without falling into contradictions, that
observed objects enjoy a separate well-defined identity irrespective of any particular
context. One cannot assign, in a consistent manner, definite sharp values to all quantum-
mechanical observables pertaining to a microscopic object, in particular to pairs of
incompatible observables, independently of the measurement context actually specified.
In terms of the structural component of quantum theory, this is due to functional
relationship constraints that govern the algebra of quantum-mechanical observables, as
revealed by the Kochen-Specker (1967) theorem and its recent investigations (e.g.,
Mermin 1995). In view of them, it is not possible, not even in principle, to assign to a
quantum system non-contextual properties corresponding to all possible measurements.
This means that it is not possible to assign a definite unique answer to every single yes-no
question, represented by a projection operator, independent of which subset of mutually
commuting projection operators one may consider it to be a member. Hence, by means of
a generalized example, if A, B and C denote observables of the same quantum system, so
that the corresponding projection operator A commutes with operators B and C ([A, B] =
0 = [A, C]), not however the operators B and C with each other ([B, C] ≠ 0), then the
result of a measurement of A depends on whether the system had previously been
subjected to a measurement of the observable B or a measurement of the observable C or
in none of them. Thus, the value of the observable A depends upon the set of mutually
commuting observables one may consider it with, that is, the value of A depends upon the
set of measurements one may select to perform. In other words, the value of the
observable A cannot be thought of as pre-fixed, as being independent of the experimental
context actually chosen. In fact, any attempt of simultaneously attributing context-
independent, sharp values to all observables of a quantum object forces the quantum
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statistical distribution of value assignment into the pattern of a classical distribution, thus
leading directly to contradictions of the GHZ-type (Greenberger et al. 1990).
     This state of affairs reflects most clearly the unreliability of the so-called ‘possessed
values’ principle of classical physics of Section 1, according to which, values of physical
quantities are regarded as being possessed by an object independently of any
measurement context. The classical-realist underpinning of such an assumption is
conclusively shown to be incompatible with the structure of the algebra of quantum-
mechanical observables. Well-defined values of quantum observables can, in general, be
regarded as pertaining to an object of our interest only within a framework involving the
experimental conditions. The latter provide the necessary conditions whereby we make
meaningful statements that the properties attributed to quantum objects are part of
physical reality. Consequent upon that the exemplification of quantum objects is a
context-dependent issue with the experimental procedure supplying the physical context
for their realization. The introduction of the latter operates as a formative factor on the
basis of which a quantum object manifests itself. The classical idealization of sharply
individuated objects possessing intrinsic properties and having an independent reality of
their own breaks down in the quantum domain. Quantum mechanics describes physical
reality in a substantially context-dependent manner.
     Accordingly, well-defined quantum objects cannot be conceived of as ‘things-in-
themselves’, as ‘absolute’ bare particulars of reality, enjoying intrinsic individuality or
intertemporal identity. Instead, they represent carriers of patterns or properties which
arise in interaction with their experimental context/environment, or more generally, with
the rest of the world;11 the nature of their existence   in terms of state-property
ascription  depends on the context into which they are embedded and on the subsequent
abstraction of their entangled correlations with the chosen context of investigation. Thus,
the resulting contextual object is the quantum object exhibiting a particular property with
respect to a certain experimental situation. The contextual character of property-ascription
implies, however, that a state-dependent property of a quantum object is not a well-
defined property that has been possessed prior to the object’s entry into an appropriate
context. This also means that not all contextual properties can be ascribed to an object at
once. One and the same quantum object does exhibit several possible contextual
manifestations in the sense that it can be assigned several definite incommeasurable
properties only with respect to distinct experimental arrangements which mutually
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exclude each other (for a technical treatment of these elements, see, Section 4). Thus, in
contradistinction to a mechanistic or naive realistic perception, we arrive at the following
general conception of an object in quantum mechanics. According to this, a quantum
object — as far as its state-dependent properties are concerned — constitutes a totality
defined by all the possible relations in which this object may be involved. Quantum
objects, therefore, are viewed as carriers of inherent dispositional properties. In
conjunction with our previous considerations of Section 2, ascribing a property to a
quantum object means recognizing this object an ontic potentiality to produce effects
whenever it is involved in various possible relations to other things or whenever it is
embedded within an appropriate experimental context.
     Consequently, a quantum object is not an individual entity that possesses well-defined
intrinsic properties at all times even beyond measurement interactions, nor is it a well-
localized entity in space and time that preserves deterministic causal connections with its
previous and subsequent states, allowing it, thereby, to traverse determinate trajectories.11
In fact, a quantum object exists, independently of any operational procedures, only in the
sense of ‘potentiality’, namely, as being characterized by a set of potentially possible
values for its various physical quantities that are actualized when the object is interacting
with its environment or a pertinent experimental context. Due to the genuinely
nonseparable structure of quantum mechanics and the subsequent context-dependent
description of physical reality, a quantum object can produce no informational content
that may be subjected to experimental testing without the object itself being transformed
into a contextual object. Thus, whereas quantum nonseparability refers to an inner-level
of reality, a mind-independent reality that is operationally elusive, the introduction of a
context is related to the outer-level of reality, the contextual or empirical reality that
results as an abstraction in the human perception through deliberate negligence of the all-
pervasive entangled (nonseparable) correlations between objects and their environments
(Karakostas 2003). In this sense, quantum mechanics has displaced the verificationist
referent of physics from ‘mind-independent reality’ to ‘contextual’ or ‘empirical reality’.
     It should be noted that the concept of a mind-independent reality is not strictly
scientific; it does not constitute a matter of physics or mathematics; it is rather
metaphysical by nature. It concerns, by definition, the existence of things in themselves
regardless of any act of empirical testing. Consequently, it does not apply to empirical
science proper. It may be viewed, however, as a regulative principle in physics research,
as a conviction which gives direction and motive to the scientific quest. As Einstein put it:
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It is basic for physics that one assumes a real world existing independently from
any act of perception. But this we do not know. We take it only as a programme in
our scientific endeavors. This programme is, of course, prescientific and our
ordinary language is already based on it. (quoted in Fine 1986, p. 95)
Granting the metaphysical or heuristic character of its nature, we nonetheless consider the
notion of a mind-independent reality as unassailable in any scientific discourse; we amply
recognize its existence as being logically prior to experience and knowledge; we
acknowledge its external to the mind structure as being responsible for resisting human
attempts in organizing and conceptually representing experience.
     But, significantly, in the quantum domain, the nature of this independent reality is left
unspecified. For, due to the generalized phenomenon of quantum nonseparability, we
must conceive of independent reality as a highly entangled whole with the consequence
that it is impossible to conceive of parts of this whole as individual entities, enjoying
autonomous existence, each with its own well-defined pure state. Neither reality
considered as a whole could be comprehended as the sum of its parts, since the whole,
according to considerations of Section 2, cannot be reduced to its constituent parts in
conjunction with the spatio-temporal relations among the parts. Quantum nonseparability
seems to pose, therefore, a novel limit on the ability of scientific cognizance in revealing
the actual character of independent reality itself, in the sense that any detailed description
of the latter necessarily results in irretrievable loss of information by dissecting the
otherwise undissectable. From a fundamental viewpoint of quantum mechanics, any
discussion concerning the nature of this indivisible whole is necessarily of an ontological,
metaphysical kind, the only confirmatory element about it being the network of entangled
interrelations which connect its events. In this respect, it can safely be asserted that reality
thought of as a whole is not scientifically completely knowable, or, at best, in d’
Espagnat’s (1995) expression, it is veiled. Hence, our knowledge claims to reality can
only be partial, not total or complete, extending up to the structural features of reality that
are approachable by the penetrating power of the theory itself and its future development.
     The term ‘reality’ in the quantum realm cannot be considered to be determined by
what physical objects really are in themselves. As already argued, this state of affairs is
intimately associated with the fact that, in contrast to classical physics, values of
quantum-mechanical quantities cannot, in general, be attributed to a quantum object as
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intrinsic properties. The assigned values cannot be said to belong to the observed object
alone regardless of the overall experimental context which is relevant in any particular
situation. Hence, well-defined quantum objects, instead of picturing entities populating
the mind-independent reality, they depict the possible manifestations of these entities
within a concrete experimental context (see, in particular, Section 4). In this respect, the
quantum-mechanical framework seems only to allow a detailed description of reality that
is co-determined by the specification of a measurement context. Without prior
information of the kind of observables used to specify a context and thus to prepare a
quantum-mechanical state, it is just not possible to find out what the actual state of a
quantum system is; measurement of observables that do not commute with this original
set will inevitably produce a different state. What contemporary physics, especially
quantum mechanics, can be expected therefore to describe is not ‘how mind-independent
reality is’, as classical physics may permit one to presume. Within the domain of quantum
mechanics, knowledge of ‘reality in itself’, ‘the real such as it truly is’ independent of the
way it is contextualized, is impossible in principle.13 Thus, it is no longer conceivable to
judge the reliability of our knowledge through a comparison with reality itself, and in the
scientific description we must adopt alternative necessary conditions for meeting a
suitable criterion of objectivity.
     To this end we underline the fact that although contextual objects cannot be viewed,
by definition, as objects in an absolute, intrinsic sense, nonetheless, they preserve
scientific objectivity; they reflect structures of reality in a manner that is independent of
various observers or of any observer’s cognition. For, since they are given at the expense
of quantum-mechanical nonseparability, the ‘conditions of their being experienced’ are
determined by the ‘conditions of accessibility’, or more preferably, in reinterpreting
Cassirer (1936/1956, p. 179) in the above expression, by the ‘conditions of
disentanglement’. Once the latter conditions are specified, the result of their reference is
intersubjective, hence mind-independent. In other words, given a particular experimental
context, concrete objects (structures of reality) have well-defined properties
independently of our knowledge of them. Thus, within the framework of quantum
mechanics, the perceptible separability and determinateness of the contextual objects of
empirical reality are generated by means of an experimental intervention that suppresses
(or sufficiently minimizes) the factually existing entangled correlations of the object
concerned with its environment. It is then justified to say that the fulfillment of
disentanglement conditions provides a level of description to which one can associate a
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separable, albeit contextual, concept of reality whose elements are commonly experienced
as distinct, well-localized objects having determinate properties.
     Furthermore, since the contextual object constitutes the actually verifiable appearance
of the quantum object, quantum objects are objectively real in the sense that they are
manifested to us in the context of lawful connections; they also contribute to the creation
of such lawful connections. Hence, we are confronted in the quantum domain with a
reversal of the classical relationship between the concepts of object and law, a situation
that has been more vividly expressed in broader terms (of a neo-kantian type, not
necessarily adopted here in toto) by Cassirer. In his words:
 ... objectivity itself  following the critical analysis and interpretation of this
concept  is only another label for the validity of certain connective relations that
have to be ascertained separately and examined in terms of their structure. The tasks
of the criticism of knowledge (“Erkenntniskritik”) is to work backwards from the
unity of the general object concept to the manifold of the necessary and sufficient
conditions that constitute it. In this sense, that which knowledge calls its “object”
breaks down into a web of relations that are held together in themselves through the
highest rules and principles. (Cassirer 1913, transl. in Ihmig 1999, p. 522; emphasis
added)
     Although Cassirer’s reference is within the context of relativity theory, where these
‘highest rules and principles’ stand for the symmetry principles and transformations
which leave the relevant physical quantities invariant, in the quantum domain, a pre-
condition of something to be viewed as an object of scientific experience is the
elimination of the entangled correlations with its environment. In other words, in order
for any object-system S of the quantum realm, its observed qualities (e.g., any obtainable
measuring results on S) to be considered as properties of S, the condition of
disentanglement must be fulfilled. Thus, disentanglement furnishes a necessary condition
for a quantum object to become amenable to scientific analysis and experimental
investigation; that is, disentanglement constitutes a necessary material precondition of
quantum physical experience by rendering the object system S a scientific object of
experience.
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4.   CONTEXTUALITY AS A DISENTANGLEMENT PREPARATION PROCEDURE
We explicitly point out that the fulfillment of such disentanglement conditions is provided
by contextuality, namely, the pre-selection of a suitable experimental context on which
the state of a measured system can be conditioned. How then one may proceed in purely
formal quantum-mechanical terms so as to establish this fact and also recover our
previous general conception of a quantum object? To begin with, we give a known
important auxiliary result concerning the objectification or actual occurrence of an
observable (or property) in a quantum state of an object. If W is a general initial state of a
quantum object S, and if we consider a change of state W→WA satisfying the requirement
that an observable A of S acquires a well-defined value a in WA  i.e., the corresponding
characteristic projector Pa satisfies the relation Tr WAPa = 1  then necessarily we have
                                           WA = ∑i Pa(i) W Pa(i) ,    i = 1, 2, ... .                                        (3)
Evidently, Eq. (3) is the Lüders (1951) formula in the so-called ‘non sorting’ version
where no information is extracted as to the specific measurement result ai of A. If the
initial density operator W is an idempotent density operator, namely, a one-dimensional
projection operator W = |ψ><ψ| representing a pure quantum state |ψ> = ∑i ci |ai>, and the
spectrum of the observable A is assumed to be non-degenerate, then Eq. (3) is restricted
to
                                            WA = ∑i |ci|2 |ai><ai| ,    i = 1, 2, ... .                                       (4)
     In the framework of our considerations, the transition W→WA should not be
considered as the result of a reduction or decoherence process, although, of course, in
quantum measurement interactions such effects may actually occur. Thus, the state WA is
not regarded here as the final post-measurement state of our object of interest, but, on the
contrary, as a conditionalization preparation procedure of the initial state of the object
with respect to the measurement context of observable A. In this sense, the transition
W→WA seems to offer the possibility of implementing a contextual-realist interpretation
of the quantum-mechanical formalism at the level of states. Hence, the contextual state
WA may naturally be viewed to represent microscopic reality in the context of a
measurement of a particular observable A.
     As argued in the preceding section, this move is physically justified by the fact that
quantum-mechanical measurements are capable of only probing contextual states. It
cannot be overemphasized that in the absence of the specification of a measurement
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context, the customary concept of a general pure quantum state is not directly amenable
to experimental investigation. In view of the fact that the projection operators, or,
equivalently, the corresponding one-dimensional closed linear subspaces, can be used to
represent both the pure states of a given object and also its quantum-mechanical
propositions of yes-no experimental tests, let us consider the following proposition ‘p’
stating that ‘the state vector associated with the projection operator W = |ψ><ψ| lies in the
subspace HW of the object’s relevant Hilbert state-space’ (i.e., ‘W∈ HW ⊆ H’). Certainly,
proposition ‘p’ determines, up to a phase factor, a pure state of the object. But does
proposition ‘p’ state an empirical fact? Does ‘p’ itself describe a quantum-mechanical
event? The answer is unequivocally no. For, as already underlined, the occurrence of any
particular kind of a quantum-mechanical event implies the use of a particular set of
observables, that is, it presupposes the specification of a definite set of empirical
predicates. The subspaces HW of the Hilbert state-space, however, neither represent nor
determine specific empirical predicates for quantum-mechanical events. The latter
correspond with the axes of possible parameterizations of HW, i.e., with an orthogonal
basis of eigenvectors of a selected observable to be measured, or, more generally, with an
orthogonal basis of joint eigenvectors of a set of mutually compatible observables for HW.
     Now, given that a particular observable has been selected and hence a particular basis
in HW has been chosen, the occurrence of a particular quantum-mechanical event
presupposes also the existence of an appropriate measurement context relative to which
the measuring conditions remain invariant. Formally, a measurement context MA can be
defined by a pair (W, A), where, as in our preceding considerations, W = |ψ><ψ| is an
idempotent projection operator denoting the general initial state of a system and A = ∑i ai
Pi is a self-adjoint operator denoting the measured observable. Then, following Howard
(1994) (see also Fine 1987), we say that a contextual state, mathematically defined by a
density operator WA, is representative for MA  when A is a non-degenerate observable
 just in case Eq. (4) is satisfied, namely, WA = ∑ni=1 |ci|2 |ai><ai|, where each |ai> is an
eigenvector of A and |ci| = |<ψ, ai>|, i = 1, ..., n. In other words, WA is a mixed state over a
set of basis states that are eigenstates of the measured observable A, and it reproduces the
probability distribution that W assigns to the values of A. Thus, with respect to the
representative contextual state WA the following conditions are satisfied:
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i)  Each |ai> is an eigenvector of A. Thus, each quantum-mechanical proposition P|ai> =
|ai><ai|, i = 1, ..., n, assigns in relation to MA some well-defined value to A (i.e., the
eigenvalue αi satisfying A|ai> = αi|ai>).
ii)  Any eigenvectors |ai>, |aj>, i≠j, of A are orthogonal. Thus, the various possible
propositions {P|ai>}, i = 1, ..., n, are mutually exclusive within MA. In this sense, the
different orthogonal eigenstates {|ai>}, i = 1, ..., n, correspond to different results of the
measured observable A or to different settings of the apparatus situated in the context MA.
iii)  Each |ai> is non-orthogonal to W=|ψ><ψ|. Thus, each proposition P|ai> whose truth
value is not predicted with certainty is possible with respect to MA.
     It is evident, therefore, that the contextual state WA represents the set of all
probabilities of events corresponding to quantum-mechanical propositions P|ai> that are
associated exclusively with the measurement context MA. In it the propositions P|ai>
correspond in a one-to-one manner with disjoint subsets of the spectrum of the observable
A and hence generate a Boolean lattice of propositions (e.g., Jauch 1968, pp. 97-101).
Thus, the P|ai>−propositions are assigned determinate truth values, in the standard
Kolmogorov sense, by the state WA.
     Furthermore, the description in terms of the representative contextual state WA is
essentially equivalent for predictive purposes to the description in terms of the state W,
since, according to the Hilbert-space formalism of quantum mechanics, for any
observable A, TrWA  =  TrWAA. The latter equality designates the fact that the initial
general state W does not have any observational significance over the contextual state as
long as predictions of measurement outcomes are restricted to the observables that are
actually measured within the context of applicability of WA. In other words, with respect
to the specification of a measurement context MA, the contextual state description WA
does yield the same results as the general state description W. Yet, this equivalence is a
consequence of the quantum-mechanical framework itself. Of course, observational
distinguishability between the two descriptions appears whenever one considers
observables incompatible to the representative (selected) observable that determines a
particular measurement context. However, if A and B are incompatible observables, then
the state WB cannot be prepared in the measurement context MA of a measurement of A,
because MA≠MB. Incompatible observables acquire distinct contextual states, since, due to
complementarity, they are physically well established in interaction to distinct, mutually
exclusive, measurement arrangements. Contextuality is at the basis of quantum-
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mechanical complementarity. Hence, given a general initial state of an object, identical
preparation of contextual states referring to the object’s incompatible observables are
impossible in quantum mechanics due to mutual exclusiveness of measurement
arrangements that incommeasurability implies.14 Consequently, the observational
equivalence between W and a representative contextual state WR, associated to an
arbitrary observable R, is both meaningful and permissible only as a context by context
equivalence, where the appropriate context is defined each time by the selection of the
measured observable R.
     In this sense, contextual quantum states represent probability distributions for the
results of measurements from the point of view of the measurement context in which they
are given. In connection to our preceding considerations of the ‘potentia’ conception, we
may naturally say that the probability distribution defined by WA represents the
potentially possible values for the measured observable A within the context MA. Or, to
put it another way, whereas the initial general state W may be thought to represent a
network of potentialities pertaining to a quantum object independently of any operational
act, WA represents the potentialities available to the object after a preparation procedure
has been set up to measure A. Hence, contextual quantum states do not represent the
potentialities inherent in the object as such, independently of the kind of measurement
actually to be performed. They represent instead Boolean perspectives of such
potentialities as viewed from the measurement context in which they are expressed. Thus,
in conformity with our previous conception of a quantum object, the totality of all those
possible perspectives, corresponding to a complete set of mutually exclusive
measurement contexts that are available to an object, exhausts the information content
that may be extracted from the object concerned.15 In this manner, the quantum object of
scientific experience may be thought of as the whole class of its aspects, ‘seen’ from
mutually different contexts.
     We finally note in concluding this work that, due to the aforementioned statistical
observational equivalence TrWA = TrWAA of Hilbert-space quantum mechanics, all
information provided by any quantal measurement procedure, with respect to a particular
measurement context MA, is consistent with the view that this information may indeed
refer to the representative contextual state WA rather than to the state W the microscopic
object was in before its embedding into MA. To explicate this point in a physically
unambiguous manner, it is crucial to re-emphasize that the contextual state WA is not the
post-measurement state, reached after an A-measurement has been carried out on the
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object concerned. It is neither a reduced statistical state resulting from the mathematical
operation of tracing out certain degrees of freedom from the compound object-plus-
apparatus system. The contextual state represents here an alternative description of the
initial state W of the object system S; it constitutes a state preparation of S in the context
of the observable actually measured. The transition W→WA to a contextual state,
therefore, need not be regarded as the result of any physical procedures or actions which,
when carried out, may change a particular physical object. The transition, in other words,
must not be viewed as a material physical process imposed on the object under
measurement, but as a redescription of the measured object which is necessitated by
taking specifically into account the context of the selected observable. For, it is important
to realize that this kind of redescription is intimately related to the fact that both states W
and WA represent the same physical object S, albeit in different ways. Whereas W refers
to a general initial state of S independently of the specification of any particular
observable, and hence, regardless of the determination of any measurement context, the
state WA constitutes an initial state preparation of S that is adapted to the observable
actually being measured, while dropping all ‘irrelevant’ reference to observables that are
incompatible with such a preparation procedure. And, as we saw, with respect to the
observable determining the kind of preparation, namely the measurement context, the
states of the measured object and the measuring apparatus can be separated or
disentangled, thus allowing us to give a consistent interpretation of their statistics that
corresponds to well-defined facts. Moreover, such a separating procedure is fully
consistent with the unitary dynamical evolution of quantum-mechanical systems. In this
regard, the aforementioned crucial distinction between the two kinds of initial states
seems to be also significant in re-assessing the notorious quantum measurement problem
from a new perspective. An elaborate development of this state of affairs, however, is left
to a future work.
NOTES
1  In this work we shall make no detailed reference to alternative interpretations of ordinary quantum
mechanics as, for instance, Bohm’s ontological or causal interpretation.
2    In a paper related to the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument, Schrödinger remarked with respect to this
distinctive feature of nonfactorizability as follows: ‘‘When two systems, of which we know the states by
their respective representations, enter into temporary physical interaction due to known forces between
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them, and then after a time of mutual influence the systems separate again, then they can no longer be
described in the same way as before, viz. by endowing each of them with a representative of its own. ... I
would not call that one but rather the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, the one that enforces its
entire departure from classical lines of thought’’ (Schrödinger 1935/1983, p. 161).
3    In this connection see Esfeld (2004). Also Rovelli (1996) and Mermin (1998) highlight the significance
of correlations as compared to that of correlata.
4  For instance, the entangled correlations between spatially separated systems can not be explained by
assuming a direct causal influence between the correlated events or even by presupposing the existence of a
probabilistic common cause among them in Reichenbach’ s sense. Butterfield (1989) and van Fraassen
(1989) have shown that such assumptions lead to Bell’s inequality, whereas, as well known, the latter is
violated by quantum mechanics. See in addition, however, Belnap and Szabó (1996) for the notion of a
common common cause in relation to quantum correlations occurring in the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger
(GHZ) situation.
5   The following account of Heisenberg is characteristic of the significance of the notion of potentiality as a
clarifying interpretative concept for quantum theory. He writes: “The probability function ... contains
statements about possibilities or better tendencies (‘potentia’ in Aristotelian philosophy), and these
statements ... do not depend on any observer. ... The physicists then speak of a ‘pure case’. ...
[Consequently,] it is no longer the objective events but rather the probabilities for the occurrence of certain
events that can be stated in mathematical formulae. It is no longer the actual happening itself but rather the
possibility of its happening  the potentia  that is subject to strict natural laws. ... If we ... assume that
even in the future exact science will include in its foundation the concept of probability or possibility  the
notion of potentia  then a number of problems from the philosophy of earlier ages appear in a new light,
and conversely, the understanding of quantum theory can be deepened by a study of these earlier
approaches to the question” (Heisenberg 1958, p. 53; 1974, pp. 16, 17).
6    See, for instance, Heisenberg (1958, pp. 42, 185); Popper (1980, Ch. 9; 1990, Ch. 1); Shimony (1993,
Vol. 2, Ch. 11). Margenau (1950, pp. 335-337, 452-454) has also used the concept of ‘latency’ to
characterize the indefinite quantities of a quantum-mechanical state that take on specified values when an
act of measurement forces them out of indetermination.
7    It should be analogously underlined that the pure quantum-mechanical state does not constitute a mere
expression of our knowledge of a particular microphysical situation, as frequently nowadays construed, thus
acquiring an epistemic status (e.g., Fuchs and Peres 2000). The quantum state designates an economic and
effective embodiment of all possible manifestations of the quantum-mechanical potentialities pertaining to
a system; it encapsulates all facts concerning the behavior of the system; it codifies not only what may be
‘actual’ in relation to the system, upon specified experimental conditions, but also what may be ‘potentially
possible’, although it does not literally represent any concrete features of the system itself. The latter
element, however, does not abolish the character of quantum state as a bearer of empirical content, since the
quantum state modulates as a whole the characteristics or statistical distributions of realizable events.
Furthermore, the statistical distribution of any such event  associated to a certain preparation procedure of
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a quantum state  is a stable, reproducible feature. Thus, the generator of these statistical regularities,
namely, the quantum state associated with preparation, can be considered as an objective feature of the
world (for details, see Sections 3 and 4).
8    The probabilistic dependence of measurement outcomes between spatially separated systems forming an
entangled quantum whole corresponds, as an expression of the violation of the separability principle, to the
violation of what has been coined in the Bell-literature as Jarrett’s (1984) ‘completeness condition’, or
equivalently, Shimony’s (1986) ‘outcome independence’ condition. A detailed description of these
conditions would fall outside the scope of the present work. A review of them may be found in Howard
(1997).
9   A recent generalized version of the so-called no-signalling theorem is given by Scherer and Busch
(1993).
10    It should be pointed out that Bohr already on the basis of his complementarity principle introduced the
concept of a ‘quantum phenomenon’ to refer “exclusively to observations obtained under specified
circumstances, including an account of the whole experiment” (Bohr 1963, p. 73). This feature of context-
dependence is also present in Bohm’s ontological interpretation of quantum theory by clearly putting
forward that “quantum properties cannot be said to belong to the observed system alone and, more
generally, that such properties have no meaning apart from the total context which is relevant in any
particular situation. In this sense, this includes the overall experimental arrangement so that we can say that
measurement is context dependent” (Bohm and Hiley 1993, p. 108).
11   Note that the so-called invariant or state-independent, and therefore, context-independent properties 
like ‘rest-mass’, ‘charge’ and ‘spin’  of elementary objects-systems can only characterize a certain class
of objects; they can only specify a certain sort of particles, e.g., electrons, protons, neutrons, etc. They are
not sufficient, however, for determining a member of the class as an individual object, distinct from other
members within the same class, that is, from other objects having the same state-independent properties.
Thus, an ‘electron’, for instance, could not be of the particle-kind of ‘electrons’ without fixed, state-
independent properties of ‘mass’ and ‘spin’, but these in no way suffice for distinguishing it from other
similar particles or for ‘individuating’ it in any particular physical situation. For a detailed treatment of this
point, see, for example, Castellani (1999).
12   In standard quantum mechanics, it is not possible to establish a causal connection between a property
A(t) at time t and the same property A(t΄΄) at a later time t΄΄, both pertaining to an object-system S, if S had
been subjected at a time value t΄, t<t΄<t΄΄, to a measurement of a property B incompatible with A. Because
the successive measurement of any incompatible property of this kind would provide an uncontrollable
material change of the state of S. Thus, a complete causal determination of all possible properties of a
quantum object, most notably, coordinates of position and their conjugate momenta, allowing the object,
henceforth, to traverse well-defined trajectories in space-time is not possible.
13   It is tempting to think that a similar sort of context-dependence already arises in relativity theory. For
instance, if we attempt to make context-independent attributions of simultaneity to spatially distant events
 where the context is now determined by the observer’s frame of reference  then we will come into
conflict with the experimental record. However, given the relativization of simultaneity  or the
relativization of properties like length, time duration, mass, etc.  to a reference frame of motion, there is
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nothing in relativity theory that precludes a complete description of the way nature is. Within the domain of
relativity theory, the whole of physical reality can be described from the viewpoint of any reference frame,
whereas, in quantum mechanics such a description is inherently incomplete.
14   It is worthy to note in this association that the impossibility of preparing the same initial contextual state
in mutually exclusive measurement arrangements constitutes a sufficient condition for preventing
derivability of the Bell inequality without invoking nonlocality (e.g., De Baere 1996).
15  It has been shown by Ivanovic (1981), Wooters and Fields (1989), see also, Brukner and Zeilinger
(1999), that the total information content of a quantum system represented by a density matrix (pure or
mixed) is optimally obtainable from a complete set of mutually exclusive (complementary) measurements
corresponding to the system’s complete set of mutually complementary observables.
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